中文5300字
一、外文原文
Chinese state’s economic cooperation Related investment:
An investigation of its direction and some Implications for outward investment By: Sumon Bhaumik and Catherine Y ap Co
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik*
Brunel University,
William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and
IZA – Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn
Email:***********************.uk
Catherine Yap Co**
governance
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Email:****************.edu
Abstract
The Chinese state undertakes large scale investments in a number of countries under the auspices of economic cooperation related investment (ECI). While there are suggestions that it is an extension of China’s soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in those countries, often for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in the literature. In this paper, we examine this investment of the Chinese state over time. Our results suggest that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain directional patterns of outward FDI. They also demonstrate that the (positive) relationship between Chinese ECI and the recipient countries‟natural resource richness is not economically meaningful. Finally, while there is some support for the popular wisdom that China’s willingness to do business with a country is not strongly affected by its level of corruption, there is much weaker support, if any, for the hypotheses that China favors doing business with countries where political rights are limited.
Running title: China’s economic cooperation related investments
Keywords: China; Economic cooperation related investment; Foreign direct investment; Natural reso
urces; Institutional quality
Introduction
2011, Risks in Global Market
The risks in the global market have been changing rapidly. The theme of the world economy in 2010 is not so much “recovery” as “adjustment”. Shocked by the global financial crisis, economies began to question and reconstruct the game rules of
the global business. This trend may continue and even deepen in 2011. Although the impact of the financial woes may clear away in this year, it is hard for the global economy to go steadily up. The side effects of the crisis are far from negligible and may lead to more uncertainties in some areas, such as Europe and Africa.
This report provides a guide to cope with the risks and manipulate the markets. Zhou Mi, an expert from the Ministry of Commerce of China makes an overview on the risks of investing and doing business in the global market and specifies those in major economies. He argues that the advanced economies will keep fighting for their frustrated financial systems in 2011 and their markets will revive
unsteadily. Some developing economies may be the gold mines in the global market in 2011, but risks still exist, apparently or potentially. Exporters and investors will have to shun or tackle these risks so that they can benefit from these markets. A senior manager from Ernst & Y oung also clarified the changes of customs policies in 2010, especially the revision of the incoterms . Along with the policy environment analysis by an expert from the Chinese Economic Diplomacy, these will help Chinese investors and exporters to adapt to the shifting rules.
Until recently, the behavior and strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) was viewed largely through the prism of the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1988). An MNE was believed to be an entity that has ownership of some special capability (e.g., technology) that it can leverage by gaining access to a resource available in another country or to an overseas market. However, rather than import the resource or export to the overseas market, the MNE might choose to internalize the process of accessing this resource or market by setting up an operation in that overseas location, because the expected profits from such internalization is higher. There is an extensive literature on both the determinants of the choice between actual market entry and alternatives like franchising, as well as the determinants of alternative entry modes like greenfield projects, cross-border acquisitions and joint ventures (JV) (see Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009, and the references therein)
The recent surge of FDI from emerging markets,2 and the consequent rise in interest about the emerging market MNEs (EMNEs), suggests that these entities do not conform to the traditional view of MNEs. Indeed, in most cases, these firms do not possess capabilities similar to developed country MNEs and that, indeed, overseas expansion is often a means to acquire such capabilities. The high profile acquisitions
of IBM personal computer business by Lenovo of China and the Jaguar-Land Rover brands by Tata Motors of India are examples of this pursuit of capabilities. At the same time, these emerging market firms have certain characteristics that manifest their successful survival in contexts with missing institutions and markets, but those that might be detrimental for successful overseas expansion. For example, it is now well understood that family ownership and formation of business groups in emerging markets are an optimal response to an environment of weak contract enforcement and missing (or imperfect) capital markets, respectively (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2009). But, as recent research suggests, family control or business group affiliation discourages overseas investment on account of factors such as weak corporate governance in such firms and reluctance to bear the cost of altering the style of management in an alien environment about which the emerging market firm has little information (see Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010, and the references therein).
In this paper, we address this lacuna in the literature, by attempting to reconcile a state’s –in this case China’s –projection of soft power with factors that usually determine the extent and direction of outward FDI from emerging markets. The choice of China as focus of our analysis is interesting on two counts. First, there is a conjecture that the Chinese state facilitates outward FDI of Chinese MNEs, by providing crucial linkages with destination countries (Buckley et al., 2008). Further, a noticeable proportion of the overseas ventures of Chinese firms has been in resource-rich developing countries where resources are de jure or de facto under government control and not easily accessible through market transactions. Our proxy for the projection of soft power is economic cooperation related investment by the Chinese state in other countries. We find that the amount and direction of this investment can be well explained by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain overseas FDI of firms. We, therefore, conclude that there is prima facie evidence that the Chinese state uses economic cooperation as a tool to facilitate overseas FDI of the Chinese MNEs (CMNEs).
the Chinese State and Outward Investment
It is generally agreed that CMNEs enjoy certain firm-specific advantages that they can leverage as they expand their operations overseas. They are able to access capital at a cost that is lower than th
eir global rivals. In part, this is on account of access to cheap credit offered by the Chinese state-owned banks or, in the case of state-owned firms, by the state itself (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006; Lardy, 1998; Warner, Hong and Xu, 2004). Access to inexpensive capital can also be the outcome of internal capital markets operated by Chinese conglomerates (Tsai, 2002). CMNEs are also able to leverage their relationships with the Chinese diaspora in the countries in which they invest, reducing the risk associated with such investment (Lecraw, 1977; Zhan, 1995).
During the early years of the reform process, Chinese overseas investments were dominated by large state-owned companies, and key investment decisions, including location of overseas operations, were dictated by political considerations (Hong and Sun, 2006). For example, the decision to invest in Hong Kong ‟s infrastructure was aimed at enhancing Chinese influence in what was, at that time, British territory on which China had a claim. By 1992, the ideological debate about the direction of China ‟s reform had been resolved, and encouragement of overseas investment by Chinese firms became an established part of the state‟s long term strategy. Overseas investment emerged as a tool to gain access to both technology and natural resources. High profile examples of such investments include those made in Indonesian and Algerian oil fields, South African mines, the Brazilian steel industry and the US technology sector. Outward FDI was also aimed at providing Chin
ese companies access to overseas markets and international brands. Haier, for example, invested in production facilities in the United States to bypass quotas and anti-dumping measures, while TCL gained access to the Thomson and Alcatel brands. The 1992-98 period witnessed a cautious implementation of this strategy to go global, but the strategy has been pursued vigorously since 1999. There is a growing literature on the strategic aspects of the trans nationalization process of CMNEs (Sauvant, 2005; Zhang, 2005).
The determinants of the direction of Chinese outward FDI itself have bee n examined.Buckley et al. (2007) have demonstrated that, in keeping with expectations, outward FDI from China is positively associated with the size of the host market, its cultural proximity to China, and its openness to FDI. Their results are also consistent with the popular perception about the natural resource-seeking nature of Chinese
outward FDI (see Deng, 2003). However, contrary to expectations, FDI is also positively correlated with a country’s political risk. They explain this anomaly by alluding to the low cost of capital for CMNEs, especially those in the public sector, and the apparent lack of sophistication of risk evaluation processes of these companies.
As mentioned earlier, in this paper, we examine an activity of the Chinese state that arguably captures that strategic dimension, namely, its overseas investments related to economic cooperation. In 2006, turnover from such economic cooperation activities was close to US$ 35.7 billion, twice the magnitude of China’s net outward FDI of US$ 17.6 billion. A large proportion of this investment is aimed at building infrastructure in the recipient countries, especially in developing countries. In late 2004, for example, Chinese contractors built office buildings in Luanda and repaired Angola’s railway system that was mostly destroyed during the country’s 27-year long civil war (Walt, 2006). In Iran, such investment has been used to develop transport-related infrastructure and dams (Walt, 2005).6 In both countries, soon after the initiation of “economic cooperation”, Chinese oil and gas companies, who are at the forefront of Chinese outward FDI, received licenses to operate large oil fields. While any causality between the economic cooperation and the aforementioned license cannot be established without further evidence, it is easy to see that there is evidence of at least correlation between China’s economic cooperation related investment on both subsequent outward FDI of Chinese companies and on their access to resources that are of national importance to other countries. In the rest of the paper, we examine this link more closely.
Data and Empirical Strategy
The data on China’s economic cooperation related investment –the dependent variable in our regression model –are obtained from various editions of China Statistical Y earbook. These are annual flows of such investment measured in (millions of) US dollars. Information provided in the Y earbooks suggests that much of the investment was used to finance projects such as construction of dams, roads and railways. The data for the explanatory variables in equation (2) are collected from a number of sources. Data on GDP and per capita GDP, measured in constant 2000 international dollars, are obtained from the 2005 version of the World Development Indicators that are released annually by the World Bank. Data on bilateral trade between China and each of the recipient countries are obtained from the

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