The role of auctions and forward markets in the EU ETS: counterbalancing the cost-inefficiencies of combining generous allocation with a ban on
banking
seifert期刊名称： Climate Policy
作者： Karl-Martin Ehrhart,Christian Hoppe,Joachim Schleich,Stefan Seifert
作者机构： University of Karlsruhe,
年份： 2005年
期号： 第1期
关键词： emissions trading;climate policy;efficiency;auctions;banking;forward
markets;experiment
摘要：From an analysis of the available national allocation plans for the first period (20052007) of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), it can be inferred that (i) the total allocation to installations covered under the EU ETS is rather generous and (ii) most EU Member States ban the transfer of allowances (banking) into the second period (20082012). In this article, we explore the cost-efficiency issues associated with such a generous allocation of allowances to the trading sectors in combination with the ban on banking. It is argued that allocation to the trading sectors is higher than implied by a cost-minimization approach. Moreover, due to the reduced level of flexibility, a ban on banking increases overall compliance costs. In addition, the results of a simulation game conducted with real company participants and with
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