Local officials as land developers:Urban spatial expansion in China
Erik Lichtenberg a,*,Chengri Ding b
a Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,University of Maryland,College Park,MD 20742-5535,USA
b
Department of Urban Studies and National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education,University of Maryland,College Park,MD 20742,USA
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history:
Received 7January 2008Revised 10March 2009
Available online 24March 2009
a b s t r a c t
We investigate conceptually and empirically the role of economic incentives in the primary land alloc
a-tion in China in the recent years.A theoretical analysis demonstrates how recent fiscal and governance reforms give rise to land conversion decisions and long run urban spatial sizes that respond to economic incentives even though the allocation of land between urban and rural uses is determined administra-tively.An econometric investigation of China’s coastal provinces finds that changes in urban area are increasing in the value of urban land and budgetary government revenues and decreasing in the value of agricultural land,results consistent with the theoretical analysis.
Ó2009Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.
This research was supported by a grant from the Lincoln Insti-tute of Land Policy.We thank Juan Feng for research assistance and Bruce Gardner,Greg Ingram,William Strange,seminar partic-ipants at the International Food Policy Research Institute and Cor-nell University,and two anonymous Journal reviewers for helpful comments.1.Introduction
China’s remarkable economic growth has been accompanied by an almost equally rapid growth in urbanization—spatially as well as economically and in terms of population.Urban expansion is,of course,a normal concomitant of economic growth,and empiri-cal studies of China find a strong association between economic growth and urban spatial expansion (Seto and Kaufman,2003;Ho and
Lin,2004;Deng et al.,2008).Nevertheless,the rapid rate of urban land expansion has been a cause of concern due to the social disruptions and rural unrest it has engendered,fears about China’s ability to ensure food security,and an apparent erosion of the central government’s ability to maintain control over devel-opment (Cao,2004;Lin and Ho,2005;Deng et al.,2006;Lichten-berg and Ding,2008).
Like China’s economic growth both nationwide and in urban areas,the spatial expansion of Chinese cities appears to have been unleashed by economic liberalization reforms that gave freer rein to market forces,most notably the creation of a secondary market for private sector long-term leasing of the rights to use existing urban land (Ding,2004;Lin and Ho,2005;Deng,2005;Zhu,2005).Case studies have documented the ways in which cities such as Shanghai,Beijing,Guangzhou,Guangdong,and others expanded
spatially in the aftermath of these reforms (Wu and Yeh,1997;Wu,1998;Gaubatz,1999;Yeh and Li,1999;Fu et al.,1999;Lin,2001;Cartier,2001;Deng,2004;Tan et al.,2005).
There are,however,limits to the degree to which these reforms have liberalized land use.Land in China remains state owned.The primary allocation of land is controlled by government entities operating within a centralized bureaucratic structure.Urban land is under the control of municipal offic
ials.Rural land is controlled by village officials.The central and provincial governments retain the right to requisition land for infrastructure,public services,and other designated uses as well as exercising oversight over the activities of local urban and village officials.Central and pro-vincial government oversight was strengthened in 1998by revi-sions to the land administration law establishing stringent administrative restrictions on farmland conversion (Lin and Ho,2005;Lichtenberg and Ding,2008).
But economic incentives may continue to undermine central-ized administrative control over primary land allocation despite these administrative restrictions,due largely to reforms in gover-nance implemented during the 1990s.These reforms decentralized authority over economic growth management and devolved great-er responsibility for raising government revenue from the central government to local authorities.The new responsibilities imposed on local officials by these governance reforms enhanced the degree to which these officials were subject to economic incentives,rais-ing the possibility that primary land allocation—and thus urban spatial expansion—might be increasingly driven by market forces.This paper investigates conceptually and empirically the extent to which economic incentives have been shaping urban spatial expansion in China.We begin with a brief description of the institu-tions governing primary land allocation in China and of the gover-nance reforms that transformed the decision framework in which municipal officials operate.W
e then present a theoretical model of municipal officials’decisions regarding primary land allocation deci-
0094-1190/$-see front matter Ó2009Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jue.2009.03.002
*Corresponding author.Fax:+13013149091.
E-mail address:elichtenberg@arec.umd.edu (E.Lichtenberg).Journal of Urban Economics 66(2009)
57–64
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sions with an emphasis on urban spatial expansion,that is,conver-sion of rural land to urban uses.The model shows how municipal officials’responsibilities for promoting economic growth and man-aging publicfinances give rise to incentives for converting rural land to urban uses similar to those generated by liberalized land markets. We then conduct an econometric investigation of factors influencing urban spatial expansion in China using data on land use,economic activity and governmentfinance in China’s coastal provinces,the re-gion of China that has experienced the most rapid economic growth in the recent years.Consistent with the results of the theoretical model,wefind
that changes in urban area are increasing in the value of urban land and in budgetary government revenues and decreasing in the value of agricultural land.
2.Land allocation in China
All land in China is formally under public ownership but is increasingly subject to private control.The key institutional change permitting expanded private land utilization was the introduction of long-term leases for land use rights,first introduced in Shenzhen in 1987,formally approved there on an experimental basis in1988,and subsequently expanded to the rest of the country in1992(Deng, 2005;Zhu,2005).Urban land belongs to the state and is adminis-tered by local officials who lease out use rights to private entities un-der long-term(40–70years)contracts.Transactions in the market for use rights involve payment of an up-front conveyance fee,which was historically set mainly by negotiation but is increasingly set by auction or tenders subject to competitive bidding(Ding,2007).
Rural land is administered by village collectives,which have authority to allocate land for rural housing,village public works, and village enterprises in addition to agriculture.Any other use of rural land requires a change in status from rural to urban land, accomplished by a process reminiscent of the exercise of eminent domain.The process begins when local urban officials requisition rural land f
or conversion to urban uses.(Provincial and central government authorities may also requisition land for large-scale infrastructure development and other public sector uses.)Compen-sation is required.Since there are no markets for rural land,compen-sation is determined by an administrative formula based largely on agricultural productivity and including payments for land,crops currently under cultivation,attachments to land,and land improve-ments.Because social services are tied to residency status(hukou), the compensation package also includes subsidies for resettlement. Even so,compensation is typically substantially less than the con-veyance fees prevailing in rapidly growing parts of China(Ding, 2007).
Requisitions of farmland are subject to oversight from higher authorities,at least in principle.In1998,the central government strengthened that oversight by imposing a set of strict administra-tive controls,including designation of land as basic farmland whose conversion to urban uses is prohibited and the so-called dynamic balance policy requiring that conversion of farmland be balanced by reclamation,land consolidation or other means(Lich-tenberg and Ding,2008).Implementation of these controls at the provincial level followed gradually.These measures appear to have had relatively little effect on the rate of urban spatial expansion in China:according to official land use statistics from China’s Ministry of Land and Resources,between1
999and2004land in cities grew at an average of around262,000hectares per year compared to an average of213,000hectares per year between1996and1999. 3.Decentralization and land development pressure
As part of its process of economic liberalization in the pursuit of higher economic growth rates,China implemented a number of reforms that decentralized its systems of governance and public finance.Together,these reforms appear to have pushed local offi-cials to take on the role of land developers,using their control over primary land allocation to promote economic growth and meet the financial obligations of municipal governments.
Financial reforms began with the substitution of taxation for remittance of enterprise profits in the mid-1980s.During the same period,the central government relaxed its control over investment decisions and growth management,transferring these responsibil-ities to officials at the local level.The result of these reforms was what some have termed the‘‘local developmental state”,referring to local governments that actively promote both public and private investments aimed at achieving greater economic growth(Zhu, 2005).Promoting economic growth has been one of the highest priorities of the Chinese government at all levels.China counts on a rising standard of living to ensure social stability and strengthen the nation.Industrial development is widely seen as the key t
o economic growth and a rising standard of living for municipalities as well as for the nation as a whole.Devolving responsibility for investment decisions and growth management to local officials can be a means of increasing economic growth be-cause local officials can be more informed about local conditions and are likely to be more responsive to local demand for infrastruc-ture,services,and other forms of support for local business devel-opment that may not be apparent to central authorities(Zhang and Zhou,1998;Lin and Liu,2001;Jin et al.,2005).This form of decen-tralization can enhance performance incentives by creating yard-stick competition for promotion opportunities and by transforming soft budget constraints into hard ones(Lin and Liu, 2001;Li and Zhou,2005).Empirical studies indicate that perfor-mance in fostering economic growth is a key to advancement for local officials as they compete for advancement with officials from other localities(Head and Ries,1996;Li and Zhou,2005).Local government investment activity also gives officials access to sources of wealth and power within their local communities (Hsing,2006;Deng,2005).
Thesefiscal and governance reforms were followed in the mid-1990s by a new set offiscal measures that included a reallocation of tax revenues in favor of the central government,which had run persistent deficits,at the expense of local governments,which had run persistent surpluses(Wong and Bhattasali,2003;Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez,2003;Zhang and Liu,2003).These reforms did not,how
ever,change local governments’expenditure obliga-tions nor did they lessen the pressure on local governments to in-vest in infrastructure and other measures to promote economic growth.
Land development offers the promise of promoting economic growth and relievingfinancial pressure at the same time.The for-mula that sets compensation for requisitioned farmlandfixes com-pensation at a level typically far below the conveyance fees local governments collect as up-front payments for long-term leases in the secondary land market,at least in areas experiencing signifi-cant economic growth.The fragmentary anecdotal evidence avail-able indicates that conveyance fees often amount to10–20times the level of compensation for requisitioned farmland(Investigating Group of Land Acquisition Reform of Ministry of Land and Resources2003).1Local governments retain all profits from land transactions.The evidence available indicates that many localities rely heavily on land transactions tofinance both ongoing obligations 1Redevelopment of existing urban land does not typically offer the same opportunities for rent capture.State-owned enterprises rather than local govern-ments stand to profit from conversion of the significant share of existing urban land under their control(Hsing,2006).Redevelopment of existing urban land under local government control tends to be quite expensive due to high costs of resettling and compensating existing tenants(Fu et al.,1999;Zhou and Ma,2000;Lin,2007).
58 E.Lichtenberg,C.Ding/Journal of Urban Economics66(2009)57–64
for public service provision and new investments in infrastructure needed to promote further economic growth(Wu and Yeh,1997; Peterson,2006;Lin,2007;Ding,2007).Survey data show that con-veyance fees accounted for an estimated27%of local government revenue nationally(Ping,2006).The share of government revenue derived from land transactions is even greater in some localities (Yang and Wu,1996;Liu,2005).
4.A model of local officials’land allocation decisions under decentralization andfiscal reform
The following conceptual model formalizes the incentive struc-tures placing local officials in China in the position of land develop-ers.We use a dynamic model of aggregate land use based on the work of Hartwick et al.(2001);the model is essentially the same as that used by Turnbull(2007)to study transition dynamics under urban growth boundaries,modified tofit China’s institutional structure.For simplicity,we consider a region with two sectors—one urban,the other agricultural.Extension to the case of multiple industries in the urban sector is straightforward but complicates the analysis without adding much insight.
The total land area of the region is divided between agricultural and urban uses.For simplicity we nor
malize the total land area of the region to1.Let L(t)denote the share of land in the region in urban uses in period t and A(t)=1ÀL(t)the share devoted to agri-culture during that period.The change in the stock of urban land at any time t is
_LðtÞ¼XðtÞ;ð1Þwhere X(t)is the amount of land converted from agricultural to ur-ban use during period t.A positive value of X(t)denotes conversion from agriculture to urban uses;a negative value of X(t),a reversion from urban to agricultural uses.
Local urban government officials choose the amount of land converted from agricultural to urban use by requisitioning agricul-tural land.Let C(1ÀL(t))denote unit compensation for agricultural land.The fact that compensation is determined by agricultural pro-ductivity suggests that compensation should be a function of the stock of agricultural land.Diminishing marginal productivity sug-gests that unit compensation is decreasing in the stock of agricul-tural land at a decreasing ,C0((1ÀL(t))<0,C00(1ÀL(t))P0. The local government receives conveyance fees V(X(t))from leasing land use rights to requisitioned farmland.We assume that V(X(t)) is increasing and concave in the amount of land leased X(t).
Economic activity in the urban area,measured by GDP,is an increasing,concave function of the stock
of urban land,R(L(t)). Local government revenue is derived partly from the local govern-ment’s share of value-added taxes derived from urban sector GDP, s R(L(t)),and partly from profit from land conversion, V(X(t))ÀC(1ÀL(t))X(t).Let c P1be the weight placed on perfor-mance infiscal management,which we assume to be increasing in the degree offinancial pressure experienced by local officials in meeting obligations for spending on social services and investing in local infrastructure.Let d be the discount rate,that is,local offi-cials’rate of time preference for obtaining results from their activities.
Our assumptions imply that(1+cs)R(L(t))+c[V(X(t))ÀC(1ÀL(t))X(t)]is concave in(L(t),X(t)).We also impose the
assumptions1þc s
c d R0ð0ÞÀCð1ÞþV0ð0Þ>0and1þc s
c d
R0ð1ÞÀCð0Þþ
V0ð0Þ<0to ensure that some land in the region remains in both agricultural and urban uses in the lo
ng run.
The objective of local officials is to maximize their ongoing re-wards from the central government.They thus choose land conver-sion X(t)at each point in time to maximize the present value of these rewards Z1
f RðLðtÞÞþcðs RðLðtÞÞþVðXðtÞÞÀCð1ÀLðtÞÞXðtÞÞ
g eÀd t dtð2Þ
subject to the state Eq.(1)and an initial condition on the amount of land in urban uses,L(0)=L0.The initial stock of urban land is likely less than the long run equilibrium amount,as is characteristic of developing countries in general and China in particular,which is widely regarded as under-urbanized(Au and Henderson,2006).
Letting k(t)to denote the shadow price of urban land at time t and dropping the time argument to simplify the exposition,the necessary conditions for a maximum include:
c½V0ðXÞÀCð1ÀLÞ þk¼0ð3ÞdkÀð1þc sÞR0ðLÞÀc C0ð1ÀLÞX¼_kð4Þplus the state Eq.(1)and the initial condition on urban land.Eq.(3) indicates that local officials’land conversion decisions are moti-v
ated by both short run profit from land transactions V0 (X)ÀC(1ÀL)and the long run value of adding to the stock of urban land,represented by its shadow price k(t).
Further insight into the nature of the long run value of the urban land stock to Chinese local government officials can be obtained from an explicit representation of the shadow price of ur-ban land,derived by integrating the costate Eq.(4)to get:
kðtÞ¼
Z1
t
f R0ðLÞþc½s R0ðLÞþC0ð1ÀLÞX
g eÀdðsÀtÞds:ð5Þ
The shadow price of the stock of urban land at any point in time has two components:(a)its contribution to future economic growth R0(L)and(b)its net contribution to alleviating futurefiscal pressure c[s R0(L)+C0(1ÀL)X],which is positive as long as tax revenues from increased economic ac
tivity in the urban area s R0(L)exceed the increase in compensation for requisitioned agricultural land caused by the rising scarcity of agricultural land C0(1ÀL)X.
Combining Eqs.(3)and(5)gives a single equation defining opti-mal land conversion conditional on the stock of urban land at any point in time.Differentiating the resulting equation(see the Appendix for a formal derivation)gives the following predictions about conditions influencing the rate at which agricultural land is converted to urban uses,that is,the rate of urban spatial expansion:
Result1.The rate of urban spatial expansion is higher in areas where land conversion is more profitable.
Result2.The rate of urban spatial expansion is lower in areas where agricultural productivity(and hence compensation for land conversion)is higher.
Result3.The rate of urban spatial expansion is higher in areas with greater expected tax revenues.
In the section that follows,we examine empirically whether changes in urban area are consistent with these results.
In long run equilibrium,when both land conversion and the change in the shadow price of urban land
equal zero,the shadow price of urban land is
kü
1þc s
d
R0ðLÞð6Þand thus the amount of land in urban use is defined by:
FðLÞ V0ð0Þþ
1þc s
c R
0ðLÞÀCð1ÀLÞ¼0ð7Þ
F(L)is monotonically decreasing in L(F0(L)=(1+cs)R00(L)/ c d+C0(1ÀL)<0),so if F(0)>0and F(1)<1,as assumed above,there exists a unique long run equilibrium stock of urban land L*.In the Appendix,we show that this long run equilibrium is stable with
E.Lichtenberg,C.Ding/Journal of Urban Economics66(2009)57–6459
unique transition paths for the cases in which the region is under-and over-urbanized initially relative to the long run equilibrium.
The economic determinants of the long run equilibrium amount of urban land are similar to those characterizing long run equilib-rium in markets with completely private land ownership.The long run equilibrium shadow price of urban land is the present value of rent generated by land at the margin,R0(L*)/d,weighted by the de-gree offiscal pressure and its contribution to tax revenues,(1+cs). The long run equilibrium amount of urban land equates the sha-dow price of urban land,weighted by1/c,with the unit cost of acquiring agricultural land,C(1ÀL*),net of short-term profits from thefirst unit of land converted from agricultural to urban use,V0(0). In a competitive market with fully private land ownership,the long run equilibrium amount of urban land would equate the after-tax present value of rent generated by urban land at the margin, (1Às)R0(L)/d,with the cost of acquiring agricultural land which, like compensation for requisitioned agricultural land,C(1ÀL*),is a function of agricultural productivity.Thus,decentralization of governance and reforms of thefiscal system,taken together, should result in land allocations that are influenced by land values in a manner similar to those of competitive land market with fully private ownership,even when primary land allocation rema
ins in the hands of government officials nominally subject to bureau-cratic constraints on decision making.The principal difference lies in the role of taxes.Local officials value land for its capacity to gen-erate tax revenues over the long run as well as for its ability to gen-erate short run profits,so taxes enhance returns to land conversion.For private developers,in contrast,taxes reduce returns to land conversion rather than increasing them.Thus,rais-ing tax rates has the opposite effect on land development in China than it has in competitive private land markets.
5.Urban spatial expansion in coastal China
Our empirical study examines the degree to which the alloca-tion of land between urban and rural uses has been determined by economic influences in the years following implementation of these governance andfiscal reforms.We focus on three factors identified in the theoretical analysis:the value of urban land(a determinant of both the profitability of conversion and the shadow price of urban land),the value of agricultural land(the basis for compensation),and government revenue(a determinant of the shadow price of urban land).
5.1.Data
We investigate the role of economic incentives in urban spatial expansion in the region of China exp
eriencing the most rapid eco-nomic growth in the recent years:the coastal provinces such as Liaoning,Hebei,Shandong,Jiangsu,Zhejiang,Fujian,and Guang-dong,plus the provincial level cities such as Beijing,Tianjin,and Shanghai.We restrict our analysis to the time period beginning in1996,thefirst year in which reliable land use data are available, and ending in2004.We use a panel of time-series cross-section data obtained from two sources.Prefecture-level data on land area (measured in mu,equivalent to about1/15hectare)in a wide vari-ety of uses,including land in cities and land planted to major crops (‘‘cultivated land”)and horticultural crops,come from records maintained by China’s Ministry of Land and Resources,which collects that information from its local subordinates on an annual basis.Prefecture-level economic and demographic data for that same time period come from provincial statistical yearbooks for the years1997–2005.These data include GDP(measured as value added)in total and by sector(primary,secondary,and tertiary),the value of agricultural output,and government budgetary revenue,all measured in RMB10,000and converted to constant2005price levels using thefixed price consumer price index reported by Chi-na’s National Bureau of Statistics(2006).The data set contains information on99prefectures.Descriptive statistics of the data used are given in Table1.
Overall,the urbanized area of this region increased by 23,347hectares between1996and2004,an ave
rage annualized rate of1.5percent per year or236hectares per prefecture per year (Table2).Year-to-year growth rates of urban area in the region as a whole ranged from2.0percent in1999–2000to6.3percent in 2003–2004(Fig.1).Cities in Zhejiang and Jiangsu,Fujian,and Shandong Provinces grew most rapidly;the provincial level cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin had the lowest average growth rates. Average year-to-year rates of urban expansion ranged from a low of0.01percent(Huizhou Prefecture in Guangdong Province)to a high of20.48percent(Zhenjiang Prefecture in Jiangsu Province). One prefecture(Shanwei Prefecture in Guangdong Province)had no land classified as urban throughout the entire period and thus experienced no growth.A few prefectures(Rizhao and Liaocheng Prefectures in Shandong Province and Zhuhai Prefecture in Guang-dong Province)experienced shrinkage in urban area,which can oc-cur because not all land converted from rural to urban status actually undergoes urban development:recent government inves-tigations found that significant amount of land requisitioned and set aside in economic development zones remained vacant and ordered13million hectares nationwide(almost two-thirds of the land planned for these development zones)returned to agricul-tural use(Cao,2004;Lin,2007).Boundary adjustments can also cause shrinkage in urban area.
5.2.Specification and estimation of the econometric model
We examine whether changes in urban area are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model using a model of the change in urban area during year t as a function of initial(period t)urban land value,agricultural land value,and government revenue:
X jt L j;tþ1ÀL jt
¼b1UrbanValue jtþb2AgValue jtþb3GovtRev jtþa jþa tþe jt:
ð8ÞHere a j denotes unobserved factors influencing land conversion in prefecture j over the entire sample period,a t denotes unobserved factors influencing all prefectures in year t,and e jt is a white noise error.Results(1)–(3)imply that the change in urban area should be increasing in the value of urban land(b1>0),decreasing in the value of agricultural land(b2<0),and increasing in government revenue(b3>0).
Table1
Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analysis.
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Absolute change in urban area3521.0510376.45 Proportional change in urban area0.0401660.1000732
Urban land area106000.891798.5 Agricultural land area54245423550356.05 Urban GDP per unit land area58.7291442.3485429 Agricultural GDP per unit land area0.1724180.1086519 Agricultural output value per unit land area0.3001360.2055954 Government budgetary revenue per unit land
area
3.269349 2.8280676 Number of observations791
Urban GDP,agricultural GDP,agricultural output value,and government budgetary revenue all in real year200510,000RMB per mu.
60 E.Lichtenberg,C.Ding/Journal of Urban Economics66(2009)57–64
We modify the estimating Eq.(8)to allow for possible nonlin-earities in two ways:(i)by adding quadratic terms:
X jt L j;tþ1ÀL jt
¼b1UrbanValue jtþb2AgValue jtþb3GovtRev jt
þb4UrbanValue2
jt þb5AgValue2
jt
þb6GovtRev2
jt
þa jþa tþe jt
ð9Þ
and(ii)by regressing the percentage change in urban area on the logs of urban land value,agricultural land value,and government revenue:
X jt
L jt
¼b1logðUrbanValue jtÞþb2logðAgValue jtÞþb3logðGovtRev jtÞþa jþa tþe jt:ð10Þ(We use the percentage change in urban land area rather than the log of urban area to accommodate prefectures with zero or negative growth in urban area.)Our theoretical analysis leads us to expect the coefficients b1,b2,and b3to have the same signs as noted above. Decreasing marginal effects of land values and government reve-nues implies b1,b2,b3<1in absolute value in the semilog model (10)and b4,b6<0,b5>0in the quadratic model(9).
Ideally,our study would utilize data on compensation for agri-cultural land requisitioned for conversion to urban use and on con-veyance fees paid for land use rights leases for each parcel of land. While there are some published aggregate data on land transac-tions at the provincial level for some yearsßthere are at present no systematic,reliable data on land transactions at more disaggre-gated levels over time.Even the most comprehensive published study we encountered,that of Ping(2006),which reported results of a survey of8provinces,8counties,and3cities,was forced to estimate land prices from more aggregated data using assumptions about leasing rates and utilization of land for public purposes.
Since data on marginal land values are lacking,we use measures of average values in their place.We use GDP in manufacturing and services per unit of urban land area in prefecture j and year t, UrbanV
alue jt=GDP23jt/L jt,as a measure of the value of urban land and thus also the profitability of converting land from rural to ur-ban status.Severe restrictions on industrial and commercial devel-opment in rural areas suggest that the overwhelming majority of secondary and tertiary GDP is generated in cities.We use two alternative measures of the value of agricultural land:the value of agricultural output per unit of agricultural land,AgValue jt=O-VAG jt/A jt,and primary GDP per unit of agricultural land,AgVa-lue jt=GDP1jt/A jt,where A jt denotes cropland,that is,the sum of cultivated and horticultural land.The value of agricultural output is the basis for determining compensation for land conversion,as noted above,and should thus constitute a more accurate measure of the economic disincentive for land conversion.But our data are missing observations for agricultural output value(see below),so we include primary GDP per unit of agricultural land—which in-cludes forestry andfisheries as well as agriculture and thus over-
Table2
Urban area(hectares)in coastal China by province,1996–2004.
Province199619971998199920002001200220032004Annualized growth rate(%)
Beijing23,20923,25123,37123,42523,85827,54927,40828,19629,713 3.1land
Fujian24,23124,77226,13128,63229,24030,16731,26732,15634,890 4.7
Guangdong107,171110,788112,980114,525118,611123,092126,252127,382130,047 2.4
Hebei74,63077,87478,85979,98180,72283,97884,81384,73884,893 1.6
Jiangsu61,67262,99765,31066,55566,89173,14482,58883,85791,058 5.0
Liaoning119,145120,775126,708131,841132,592133,019134,257135,167140,105 2.0
Shandong119,296121,578126,368130,780133,671138,858141,980150,334171,107 4.6
Shanghai27,88127,88128,81828,82128,82728,82728,82728,82728,8270.4
Tianjin20,25120,40420,40420,40420,44220,61220,69320,92421,5430.8
Zhejiang32,52735,23436,09537,79240,97045,85952,30957,82764,6059.0
Total610,012625,554645,045662,756675,825705,103730,392749,410796,787
3.4
Fig.1.Year-to-year growth rates of urban area in China’s coastal provinces,1996–2004.
E.Lichtenberg,C.Ding/Journal of Urban Economics66(2009)57–6461
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