Cognitive Context Models and Discourse
Teun A. van Dijk
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
1. Mental models
Since the early 1980s, the notion of mental model has been quite successful in cognitive psychology in general, and in the theory of text processing in particu-lar (Garnham 1987; Johnson-Laird 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983; Van Oos-tendorp & Zwaan 1994).*
Such models have been conceptualized as representations in episodic memory of situations, acts or events spoken or thought about, observed or par-ticipated in by human actors, that is of experiences(Ehrlich, Tardieu & Cavazza 1993).
In the theory of text processing, such (situation or event) models played a crucial role in establishing the necessary referential basis for the processing of anaphora and other phenomena of coherence (Albrecht
& O Brien 1993). They further explained, among many other things, why text recall does not seem to be based on semantic representations of texts, but rather on the mental model construed or updated of the event the text is about (Bower & Morrow 1990).
Conversely, mental models also play a role in the much neglected theo-ry of discourse production, viz., as the mental point of departure of all text and talk, from which relevant information may be selected for the strategic construction of their global and local semantic structures.
Many experiments have confirmed these hypotheses, and have shown at text comprehension and recall essentially involve a strategic manipulation of models, for instance by matching text information with structures of the mental space of such models (Morrow 1994; Morrow, Greenspan & Bower 1989; Zaal & Van Oostendorp 1994). The notion of mental space is some-times also used in formal linguistics as a construct that has similar functions as our notion of a mental model (Faucormier 1985).
Models also embody the interface between episodic, personal knowl-edge of events, on the one hand, and the socially shared beliefs of groups. Thus, model construction and updating involves fragments of instantiated sociocul-tural knowledge, whereas such shared beliefs or other social cognitions are in turn partly derived from episodic models by processes of generalization, ab-straction and decontextuali
zation. At the same time, given their individual na-ture, models are also construed or updated on the basis of other representations in episodic or personal memory, such as generalized and abstract personal models of events, personality factors, or personal attitudes. In other words, models typically embody both the (instantiated, applied) knowledge and other beliefs of social groups as well as the cognitive representations that define in-dividual persons self-awareness (Hull et al. 1988).
For the discussion in the present volume, it is interesting to note that mental models, while being representations of personal experiences, in fact also provide a more detailed and empirical account of some aspects of the notion of consciousness. That is, being conscious of an event, action, object or per-son, and their properties, involves the construction or updating of episodic models. This does not mean that all information processing (of discourse, ac-tion, or other events) proceeds consciously. There is enough evidence to sug-gest that many levels of analysis and understanding are more or less conscious, although these may always be made conscious as soon as processing occur, e.g., when unknown words, complex syntax, semantic incoherence or prag-matic inappropriateness needs to be dealt with (for details, see van Dijk & Kintsch 1983; see also Davies & Humphries 1993; Greenberg & Tobach 1983; Jackendoff 1987). Models however represent the result of the more or less con-scious processing of knowledge about discursive or other events (Johnson-Laird 1983).
This does not mean, however, that all levels and all details of models are always conscious. Sometimes only the higher macrolevels of events need to be conscious for active processing (understanding, production) in Short Term Memory. And conversely, when (depending on context) we need to be conscious of lower levels or specific details of events, then deeper and more detailed analysis or construction of models will take place. This amount and level of processing of models may be regulated by an overall Monitor (see be-low), but we shall be proposing below that many of the functions of this elusive (theoretical) Monitor are in fact carried out by models of the context. This is not only true for text processing, but also for the processing of social informa-tion relevant for context model construction (for further discussion, see Bargh 1984; Mandler & Nakamura 1987; Natsoulas 1992; Shallice 1988).
Lacking alternative formats of representation, episodic models are usually conceived of as consisting of (abstract) propositions, although also analog information has been proposed as a necessary element of our models of reality in order to account for people s memory of spatial or configural in-formation about objects, places, people, or events.
Despite the rather extensive work on mental models, an explicit theo-retical account of their internal structures has so far not been provided. As is true for most other memory representations, they may b
e thought of as hierar-chically structured networks, possibly organized by a number of fixed catego-ries, that is, as schemata of some kind. Thus, higher level, abstract nodes may represent the macrostructure of a model, and the more detailed, lower levels, the microstructure of a model, representing the actual details of events, people and situations. This familiar distinction in text processing at least explains what we know about text processing for a long time, viz., that macrostructures usu-ally tend to be better recalled than microstructures, e.g., because of their func-tional relevance, structural importance (they organize much other information) and hence their accessibility.
Me may only speculate about the further features that define model structures. There is some linguistic evidence (e.g., from sentence semantics and narrative structures) that model structures may be organized by the categories that define events, such as Setting (Place, Time), Participants in various roles (Agent, Patient, etc.), an Event or Action, and possibly various Circumstances, each with their own Modifier categories. This simple structure would reflect, if not explain the characteristic semantic structure of complex propositions as well as the case structure and ordering of syntactic structures in discourse (Dik 1989). In other words, model structures should be seen as the strategic sche-mata people use in the fast interpretation of the events in their daily lives, and it is not surprising that such sc
hemata would also shape at least some of the structures of the discourses engaged in by speech participants when talking or writing, reading or hearing about such events.
In this paper we shall also ignore the specific representational, format of models, but simply assume that they are networks that may be represented by propositions organized by schematic categories, like Participant or Setting. Although many elements of the theory of mental models, such as their internal structures, or their relations with specific semantic representations of texts, on the one hand, and their relations with cognitions in semantic(or rather social) memory, are still on the agenda, this account of the nature and role of mental models is both straightforward and persuasive. Models simply explain many properties of text processing that were hitherto obscure or ignored, or dealt with in more ad hot ways.
One element virtually lacking in most theories of mental models so far, is their evaluative dimension. People not only build and use models of events in order to represent their knowledge about such events, but also in order to repre-sent their opinions about them. One may have a model of a specific party, a car accident, or of a new event in the war of Bosnia, as reported in the media, and we may expect that this model will also embody some information about whether we liked or disliked the event, or some feature of the event. Obviously some of these models (like that about Bosnia) may be very co
mplex, and con-sist of many partial models of separate events. The same may be true for many other opinions, and possibly even of the emotions associated with an event. That specific opinions or emotions, and not only knowledge propositions may facilitate recall of events suggests that these are somehow coded in or with the model (Bower 1980; Tan 1994).
In a similar way as personal, episodic event knowledge is associated with general, socially shared knowledge, the assumption that models also rep-resent opinions further suggests that these opinions are also linked with social cognition, viz., socially shared opinion structures, such as attitudes, ideologies, and their underlying norms and values (van Dijk 1990, 1995). That is, our models about (events in) Bosnia are obviously a function of (among other things) our social group attitudes and ideologies: To wit, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims will have a very different interpretation of the events in Bosnia. Such a different interpretation or model, not only may involve different knowl-edge, different points of view or perspectives, but of course also different opinions derived from different attitudes, ideologies and other social cognitions that are a function of different social, political or economic interests of the groups involved, and hence of their members. It is this evaluative(or affec-tive) nature of models that requires our main attention in future model theories.
For the discussion in this book it is especially important to emphasize that we do not vaguely consider
the ideologies on which such evaluations are based as forms of false consciousness, as is common in the Marxist-Leninist tradition of ideology analysis (Eagleton 1991; Wood 1988). Rather, we see them as specific, schematically organized self-representations of groups (including such group categories as Identity, Tasks, Aims, Position, Values and Resources, together defining the Interests of the group) that control the attitudes and models of its members (van Dijk 1995).
2. Context models
There is however another missing link in the theory of mental models and their links with the structures and strategies of discourse. Language users not only
form or update models of events or situations they communicate about, but also of the communicative event in which they participate. This deictic, reflexive and pragmatic dimension of language use has been virtually lacking in current mental model theories (for an early approach, see van Dijk 1977). During a conversation, a lecture, doctor-patient interaction, reading the newspaper or watching TV, participants of course also need to mentally monitor such en-counters themselves, e.g., by planning, executing, controlling or indeed under-standing them. It is here proposed that such ongoing, continuously updated epi-sodic representations should be conceptualized as a special type of models, viz., context models.
The structures and functions of context models are straightforward. Their structures should of course be similar to those of any kind of model: Af-ter all, a communicative event or situation, that is, a context, is not essentially different from other events or (inter)actions people participate in. In this case, however, actors self-represent themselves as speech-participants, and the ac-tivities involved are constituted by the very discourse, verbal interaction or speech acts now being enacted or received. That is, the categories of the model schema, such as Setting (Time, Place), Circumstances, Participants and Action (and their modifiers), including those that represent opinions), now define the mental (and hence subjective) counterpart of the canonical structures of a communicative situation or context as we know them from a vast literature in ethnography, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, microsociology and social psychol-ogy (Argyle, Furnham & Graham 1981; Cicourel 1987; Cook 1990; Dascal & Weizman 1987; Duranti & Goodwin 1992; Forgas 1985; Givón 1989; Gum-perz 1989; Gumperz & Hymes 1972; Hymes 1972; Watson & Seiler 1992).
On the basis of this and other work, we shall assume that contexts typi-cally consist of at least the following major categories, possibly each with their own internal schematic structure, as if they were sub-models:
discourse
Setting: location, timing of communicative event;
Social circumstances: previous acts, social situation;
Institutional environment;
Overall goals of the (inter)action;
Participants and their social and speaking roles;
Current (situational) relations between participants;
Global (non-situational) relations between participants;
Group membership or categories of participants (e.g., gender, age).
This means that, first of all, we now have a theoretical framework to begin to represent obvious elements of discourse and communicative events such as in-tentions, goals or purposes, as is true for any kind of action and interaction. Note though that a mental model of a communicative event is not the same as the theoretical analysis of communicative events per se: Context models are episodic, personal and hence subjective interpretations and experiences of the communicative event or context. That is, speech participants will usually have similar or overlapping models of the event they participat
e in, but their models are both theoretically and practically unique and different, as is true for all models: Rather trivially, speech participants have different goals, perspectives, knowledge, opinions, etc., about ongoing text and talk. In written communica-tion this may even be more pronounced, given the obviously different models of writers and readers, models that also have different information in their Set-ting (Time and Place) category. Indeed, routine complications in talk may be largely based on conflicting context models, and negotiation may be necessary to strategically manage such conflicts.
More than mental models of events, context models are under perma-nent change. Especially in spontaneous conversation, participants need to con-stantly monitor the other participant(s) as well as the other elements of the context and adapt their context models accordingly in order to be able to par-ticipate appropriately and competently (Slama-Cazacu 1961, 1973, 1981). Hence, context models are routinely and ongoingly updated, negotiated, chal-lenged, and interactively managed. Indeed, much of the conversational work being done in interaction pertains to the mutual control of participants context models. In written communication such immediate interaction takes another form, e.g., the strategies writers use to manage the context models of the read-ers, for instance by genre markers, self-descriptions as communicators, explicit definitions of the context or speech act (this is a threat), making their goals or intentions explicit, asking for cooperation or the benevolence of readers, and so on. Many of these strategies are well-known since classical rhetoric.
If we assume that context models have the same basic structure as event models, and that such a structure is strategically built up just prior to and then updated during discourse processing (conversation, reading, writing), we still need to know how such a (partial) model is actually used during processing. In the same way as not all information of the previous parts of the discourse is relevant for later understanding (and the same is true for all details of the model constructed for such a text), we may assume that the complexity of the context and of its mental model also does not allow people to keep track of all rele-vant context factors. This means that again notions of importance and relevance

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